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EUROPE'S  FUTURE,  EUROPE'S  CHOICES 
Hr  Chairman, 
It is a  very great pleasure and  an honour  for  me  to 
take part in this  annual  congress  of the  Dutch European 
Movement.  From  the very beginning of the European  adventure 
the people  and  government  of the  Netherlands  have  been in the 
van of our progress  together in unity.  You  are keeping  faith 
with the European idea and  I  salute your faith and  your  efforts 
to give effect to it. 
*  * 
* 
What  is it that we  believe? 
The  essence of  our European faith lies,  I  think,  in our 
conviction that the  exclusive sovereign state is no  longer  - if 
it ever was  - an adequate  or a  satisfactory principle  for  the 
political organisation of  the  peoples  of our  crowded continent. 
The  century leading up  to  the  Second World t-J'ar  vJi tnessed 
the paradox of  the increasing interdependence  and  interpenetration 
of the  economies,  of the social life and  culture of  the  European 
peoples,  accompanied  by  the increasing bitterness  and conflict 
betvJeen  them which culminated in the holocaust  of the Hitler war. 
Thoughtful  men  and women,  reflecting  amid  the  ruins  of that war 
upon  the destiny of their continent,  concluded  that  the  origin 
of this  paradox lay in its increasingly obsolete division into 
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distinct national  sovereignties  - into separate political 
systems  from whose mutual  exclusiveness  arose  the danger that 
they might  only be  able to preserve  their raison d'etre by 
fanning  the  rivalries  and  suspicions  of their different peoples. 
So it became  evident  after_ the war  that  the way  forward  lay 
:Ln  the  development  of  a  new  principle for  the 
organisation of Europe  - a  principle which would  foster  the 
elements  of unity rather than the  elements  of division in our 
common  European heritage,  and which would  be flexible  enough  and 
dynamic  enough  to adapt  to the ceaseless  economic  and  social 
changes  which  are  a  necessary feature of life in an industrial 
age. 
This  was  the analysis,  and  the  European Movement  was  the 
fruit of it.  The  genius  of  the first generation of European 
statesmen  - Schuman,  Monnet,  de  Gasperi,  Adenauer  - lay in \vhat 
they did  to  turn the analysis  and  the broad stream of ideas  that 
flowed  from it into concrete  and  specific achievements.  They 
built a  network  of  institu~ions and  procedures,  of commitments 
and  reciprocal  obligations,  which  turned the  dream  of\ EuropEO·an 
unity into the  substance of the  Europe~n Community. 
But  the Europe built by  the  founding  fathers  of the 
Community  is manifestly not  a  complete realisation of  the 
European vision.  What  they did was  to lay the  foundations.  It 
falls  to us  and  to  our  successors  to complete  the edifice. 
Let  there be no  doubt  as  to the magnitude  of this  task. 
Wl1at  one might call the  'first' Europe- the  Europe  of the  Coal 
and  Steel  Community  of Euratom  and  of  the  Economic  Community  -
is essentially an  economic  construction.  It is  based upon  the 
removal  of barriers  to the operation of economic  forces  within 
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the  Community  and upon  the transfer to  the  Community  of some 
of the limited regulatory powers which  our member-states  had 
allo-v1ed  themselves  in the  economic  sphere.  Although  the 
achievements  of this  'first' Europe have  been considerable and 
should not  be underestimated  - the  common  market,  the  co~mon 
agricultural policy,  the  common  external  commercial  policy and 
the overseas  development policy- the  'second'  Europe which 
must  grow  out of it will have  to\become  a  lot more positive. 
And  the making  of the  'second'  Europe will be  even more 
difficult  than that of the  'first' - although we  start upon  our 
task with  the inestimable advantage  of the  twenty years' 
success  of the  economic  Europe,  and with the basic  elements  of 
European political organisation already in being in the  shape 
of the institutions established by  the  Rome  Treaty.  It will be 
more  difficult to build the  'second'  Europe  because you  cannot 
print pmv-er  in the way  that you  can print money  - you  can  only 
redistribute it or share it.  And  it is only upon  such  a  sharing 
or even  a  redistribution of power  that the  'second'  Europe  can 
be built. 
*  * 
* 
So  much  is clear as  a  matter of logic.  But let us  be 
realistic.  A new  sharing of power in the  Community,  or a 
redistribution of it, is not  going  to  come  about merely  because 
it is logically implied in the idea of progress  towards  further 
unity in Europe.  Those  v1ho  are charged  v.7L th responsibility 
under  the  present distribution of powers will not lightly 
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accept  the reduction of their authority.  Before  they consent 
to changes  they will want  to  be  sure - and in this  they will 
be  acting quite properly - that the interests for which  they 
are responsible can  be better safeguarded under  any  new  ~rrange­
ment  of pm.vers •  Although  a  time may  come  when  they may  accept 
the need  for  a  comprehensive  reconstruction of  the  Community 
arrangements  within a  new  framework  of European Union,  it seems 
that for  the present  and for  the  foreseeable future  they will 
prefer to deal in a  piecemeal  and pragmatic  fashion with each 
particular problem as it arises  - rather than asking of each  and 
every proposal  or policy hovJ  it can be made  to serve the  concept 
of European Union. 
In these circumstances  there will no  doubt  be many  of you 
who  will conclude that European unity must  therefore after all 
turn out  to be  a  Utopia.  There is undoubtedly  a  malaise in the 
Community  today,  one  of whose  causes  - or perhaps it is  a  symptom?  -
is our present failure  to make  further progress  together.  If the 
governments  of our member  states continue to think and act as 
they do  - if they go  on  seeing Europe  as  nothing more  than a  way 
of pursuing their short  term national interests  - how  can we  have 
any warrant  for  expecting that the substance of our European 
faith and vision will in time  be more  fully realised? 
Let me  tell you why  I  am  confident  that our hopes  for  the 
growth  of the  'second'  more  intimate and more  effective Europe 
will in due  course be fulfilled. 
The  fact is  that the analysis  upon which  the  European 
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Movement  was  founded  remains  sound  - that there are important 
respects in which the system of exclusive national  sovereignties 
is obsolete in that it is no longer sufficient to meet  our needs 
in the modern age. 
Think of any single major social or  economic  problem  - and 
therefore political problem - facing  any of our member  countries 
today,  and ask yourself whether its solutions  do  not  transcend 
national frontiers  and national  jurisdictions.  At  the most 
fundamental  level  the expectations  and values  of  our people, 
the aspirations and appetites which  give meaning  to their lives 
and which  define  the essential problems  of  the  age,  are less  and 
less  the product of purely national cultures  and more  and more 
the fruits  of a  transnational civilisation - the culture of 
advanced industrial society - which is wider even  than Western 
Europe in its scale.  Inflation,  unemployment,  economic  gro~vth: 
in the increasingly unified European society of the first quarter 
of the twentieth century there is not  one  of these  economic 
phenomena,  which necessarily preoccupy governments  in every 
country,  that can be dealt with effectively by  action at the 
national level alone. 
In the kind of society in which we  in Europe live change 
is incessant and inevitable.  It is built into the structure of 
our  economy  and  of the  technological  dynamism upon which it is 
based.  More  than that,  there is also a  kind of inner logic  in 
that process  of change  - a  logic of the  expanding scale of 
economic  operations,  of deepening specialisation and division of 
labour,  of an  increasing integration of  economic  and  social 
forces  which is simultaneously ever more  complex  and  ever more 
wide-ranging in the elements which compose it.  It is  this 
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dynamism,  this logic, which is carrying us  irresistably beyond 
the  familiar frontiers  of the sovereign state system in which 
the political life of Europe  has  been cast for  these last three 
centuries,  and which is confronting us  ever more  forcibly with 
the need  for  a  new  and more  integrated and cooperative.way of 
organising  our affairs  in Europe.  And  that 
necessity is flowing not 1just  from  an ideal  or vision of a 
European Union but  from  the increasingly evident  fact  that 
national interests and national responsibilities  can only be 
pursued effectively upon  the basis  of European_unity. 
I  believe that it is in this way  and  by  the light of this 
\lnderstanding of the inadequacy of exclusively national  responses 
to the realities  of the present  and  future that we  can best 
understand  the  economic  and monetary confusions  that have  been 
such a  prominent  feab~re of the  European  scene  over  the past five 
years.  Bet,veen  1945  and  1971  the essential political  framework 
for  the  functioning  of  the Western  European  economy  - indeed for 
the  economy  of the whole  o~ the  advanced industrial world  - was 
supplied by  American  power  and  American leadership.  Since  the 
beginning of this  decade  that  framework  - at least in the 
economic  sphere - has  been largely dismantled.  And  we  in Europe 
have  thus  been confronted by  the challenge of living up  to  our 
European convictions  - by  the challenge of making  and sustaining 
our  own  framework  for  the management  of  European  economic  and 
monetary  forces  that can no  longer be contained within the 
familiar structures of national  power.  The  basic  theme  of 
European history over the past five years  is surely to  be  found 
in the efforts  of our  governments  and of  the institutions of  the 
Community  to come  to grips with  this  challenge even if we  have not 
yet mastered it. 
The  outcome  of these efforts  ~o meet  the  chall~n~e 
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of change is of course as  yet obscure.  There is  a  curtain 
over  the future.  But! we  have already gone  so 
far along the road of European integration that there will  be 
no  turning  back.  No  one  of our countries can opt  out  of  the 
unified European  economy  that has  already come  into being 
without  doing  intolerable damage  to itself.  The  choice wl1ich 
faces  the  governments  and  the institutions  of our  Community  can 
therefore be reduced essentially to the choice between building 
a  viable and  enduring\framework for  the conduct  of 
economic  and social change,  or allowing that process  of change 
to have its way  without  the benefit of deliberative political 
control or guidance. 
So  much  for what  one  might call the internal motor which 
impels us  towards  closer union in Europe.  There is also  an 
external motor which  impels us with increasing force  in the 
same  directiono 
The  movement  of events  in the world outside  Europe  is 
increasingly imposing upon us  the obligation to give  form  and 
substance to Europe's  international personality- an obligation 
which we  cannot refuse and which manifestly cannot  be fulfilled 
without that personality developing  a  new  political dimension. 
This  external  impulse  stems  from  the  two  great facts  of 
world politics in the modern  age  - from  the continuing 
differences  between East  and West,  between  the  international 
system centred on  Russia  and  that of the so-called  'capitalist 
world',  and  from  the  emerging dialogue between  North and  South, 
between  the rich industrialised countries  and  the poor 
countries  of the developing world. 
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Europe  can no more  opt,out of these facts  of her  internm2~ 
environment  than her member-governments  can opt out of our internal 
processes  of  economic  integration.  We  are caught up  in a 
dynamic  process  of international  development  in the  relations 
between North and  South and East and West which is bound  -
together with the internal  dynamic  of economic  and social change 
within the  Cormnunity  - to lea.d us  in time  towards  a  fuller 
realisation of our European vision.  The  foundations  of the 
'second'  Europe have  already been laid;  and both the need  to 
build it and  the materials  for its building are mounting with 
every day  that passes.  What  is necessary now  is that those who 
must build it - the governments  and peoples  of Europe  - should 
comprehend  the realities of their situation and set about their. 
task with the necessary -v;rill. 
* 
* 
The  will that is needed is of course  a  political will. 
It is  the will to enable Europe  to find  and  exert her strength 
not in a  distant future but over the years  immediately ahead. 
And  for this  to occur it is of crucial  importance  that 
the governments  of our member  states  should recognise the extent 
to which  the true balance of their interests and responsibilities 
is weighted in favour  of European policies  ~nd a  European 
approach.  .  ... 
This  is not,_ I  believe,  a  question of irrnnediate 
institutional changes  or of  the perhaps  prematUre  acceptance  by 
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national governments  of  a  new  distribution of formal  powers  and 
political competences.  Rather,  it is a  question of  them 
recognising  the limits of their capacity to master their problems 
by acting separately,  and  of their accepting that European 
solutions  can only work if our governments  are prepared.to act 
together to make  them work.  For at this  stage in the  development 
of the  Corn:."TTLlnity  with its limited institutional powers  a  heavy 
responsibility for Europe's  future  rests upon  the  governments  of 
its members.  The  European interest can  only prevail when  our 
governments  are prepared to ask  themselves  in relation to their 
policy decisions  not  only where  lies  the national  interest,  but 
also where lies the European interest. 
What  needs  to  be  realised is  that the  whol~ of the 
Community  can be,  and must  be,  greater than  the  sum  of its 
parts.  Europe  cannot  function  as  the  lowest  common  denominator 
of the various  interests  pursued  by  the  governments  of its member 
states.  If it is to develop  effectively it must  be  built upon  a 
common  recognition of the  ~ssent~al importance of the  European 
interest,  and upon  a  conscious  decision that the successful 
pursuit of  the European interest corresponds with  the highest 
national  interest of each of the  Community's  members. 
It is not a  question of the member  states making 
sacrifices  on  the altar of European unity.  They are 
being  asked  to recognise that every contribution they make  to 
the strengthening of the  Community  enhances  their own  prosperity 
and  security as  members  of the  Community. 
Take,  for  example,  the  question of  the  Community's  budget. 
Ther-.·  are  t\vO  different ways  of looking at the matter  - one 
vhich regards  the  Corrmruni ty budget  as  merely  an  optional 
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alternative to national spending,  and  the other which recognises 
that it is the instrument of European policies that make 
possible the attainment of objectives which are beyond  the 
reach of national programmes. 
Take  another  example  - that of the  Community's  external 
relations..  Each  of  our countries  has  its ov.m  tradition in 
foreign policy - a  tradition which is the compound  expression 
of its national history and culture and of a  contiru~ously 
reviewed assessment of the enduring national interest amid  the 
flux of world events.  The  foreign policy of  a  united Europe will 
also gradually take  shape in its ovm  tradition.  But  although 
this  tradition will  be moulded by the same  considerations which 
have  shaped our national policies, it will inevitably reflect a 
synthesis  of all the historical elements  and abiding interests 
that go  to make up  our  Community.  Indeed,  it will be more  even 
than a  synthesis: it will be  something quite new  and different 
reflecting the  emergence of a  quite new  and different factor  -
the European factor  - in world affairs. 
It will be  a  policy which projects  the essential character 
and interests of European society,  committed to pluralism, 
democracy,  and the social-market economy.  It will therefore 
join us  in close ties with like-minded countries all over  the 
world,  and notably with the United States.  It will also be  a 
policy which reflects Europe's historic concern with the 
developing world,  and  the various  elements  of which that concern 
is made  up  - humanitarianism,  zeal  for cultural rayonnernent,  the 
desire to do  business with a  sense of responsibility.  It will 
reflect the historical ties of kinship  and the mutual  interests 
which bind Great Britain to the  Commonwealth,  and  the cultural 
bonds  which  join France  and  Italy to the other countries  of  the 
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Mediterranean border-land and  to Africa as well  as  those which 
join the Netherlands with the East  Indies  and  the German 
Federal Republic with its compatriots  and neighbours  to the 
East. 
All  of these historic elements will find their place in 
Europe~s external relations.  But  they will not  do  so in the 
forms  they have  taken in the past,  nor can they continue  to  be 
defined exclusively by  one  or other national connection. 
Further,  Europe will be challenged to fresh creativity as  new 
subjects  take their place on  the agenda of international 
relations,  as  new  preoccupations  emerge  and  new  instruments  of 
international policy are  forged. 
And  so  I  believe it can be  shown  to our  governments,  and 
the unfolding of events will bring home  to  them,  that further 
progress  towards  European unity is more  than a  matter of 
sentiment  or faith  - rather is it the only way  in which  they 
can hope  successfully to realise the responsibilities  and pursue 
the interests 'vi th which  th.ey  are charged. 
As  in the past,  so in the  future,  the  development  of 
common  European institutions is  the key to our progress  together. 
Above  all we  need  a  strong and confident European political 
authority capable of expressing  the European will and able  to 
make  it effective.  Here lies the  importance  of the European 
Council  of  the heads  of government  of the Member  States. 
Over  the year immediately ahead it may  be  that the main-
stream of European  development will  be  along the lines  of further 
cooperation rather than  of further integration.  But,  amid  the 
ebb  and  flow  of  the  tides  of politics and  the shifts  of fortune 
which  determine  the rise and fall  of national  governments,  there 
is no  substitute for  the  existence of an accepted and 
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established fremework  of legal,  institutional and powerful 
structures whose  essential function it is to seek only to define 
the European interest.  The  further  development of cooperation 
between  the Member  States is of course essential to the  future 
of the European Union.  But if the cooperation is going to  be 
sufficient for our needs it must  lead up  to that element of 
obligation - the pressure to reach  a  conclusion in the  corrmon 
interest - which marks  the difference between a  coalition and a 
Community. 
Eh~erience has  shown us  that Europe cannot be  expected 
to flourish  - let alone  find its full vigour  - in the stoney 
soil of national interests,  tended only by  the grasping hands 
of national governments.  It must  be nourished by  a  generous  and 
lively faith and by  the concern and involvement of our peoples. 
This  is where  the importance lies of direct.elections  to 
the European Parliament  - in its capacity to engage  the 
imagination and interest of the citizens of Europe in every walk 
of life and in every part of the  Community.  It will bring into 
being an essential new political dimension in European affairs. 
I  do  not believe that we  can expect  a  directly-elected European 
Parliareent to have  immediate effect on  the balance of institutional 
forces within the  Community  - although the Parliament will of 
course be greatly strengthened by  the  enhanced legitimacy which 
direct elections will give it.  The  importance  of  a  directly 
elected Assembly lies rather in the way  it will bring to bear 
both upon public  opinion and upon  the governments  and institutions 
of  the  Community  the  i1~fluence of men  and women  who  are dedicated 
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to a  strong and vigorous  Europe  and who  know  that they have 
the right and  the obligation to make  their views  felt. 
*  * 
* 
Mr.  Chairman:  the world in which we  live is 
Europe with a  challenge.  It is essentially the  same  challenge  as 
that which was  recognised by  the  founders  of the European 
Movement  and the builders of the  'first' Europe  - the challenge 
of developing  a  new  principle for  the more  effective organisation 
of our continent. 
We  have  already begun to come  to grips with this  challenge. 
The  patrimony of the  'first' Europe which we  have  been bequeathed 
by  the founding  fathers  of the  Conmruni ty will endure.  Now  \ve 
must get on with the  job of building the  'second'  Europe  upon 
these foundations. 
There are many  difficulties.  But it is not  only because 
I  am  a  congenital optimist that  I  believe we  will  overcome  them. 
The  movement  of history \vhich is posing this challenge is also a 
movement  which is on  our side.  It is possible that we  may  miss 
or mar  our fate.  But if we  do it will not  be merely  a  missed 
opportunity for which  our children and  our children's children 
will reproach us.  In our progress  together  towards  European 
unity it is not  just the luxury of realising an interesting 
political possibility which is at stake.  It is  the livelihood 
and the liberty of those who  come  after us  which  depends  upon 
how  we  in our generation make  our European choice. 